On the Scrum Master Toolbox Podcast

I’m excited to be on a recent episode of Vasco Duarte’s Scrum Master Toolbox Podcast along with Karl Scotland and Henrik Mårtesson. The three of us discussed strategy, doctrine, and decision-making in Agile and business contexts.

Karl has some wonderful tools and approaches for what he calls Strategy Deployment (conceptualizing and promulgating a plan throughout an organization). The X-Matrix is a way to visualize desired outcomes, strategic approaches, specific tactics, and processes. The format of the matrix allows them all to be related together. Along with his Backbriefing and Experimenting A3s, the X-Matrix forms a three-level hierarchy for synergistic planning. Karl waked me through this approach during a workshop at Lean Agile Scotland last year. He emphasized that while the tools are useful, the real value comes from the conversations they trigger.

I would agree with that assessment, which is why I stress the importance of the Naval War College’s “conference method” when I bring up the U.S. Navy’s historical tool for strategic decision-making, the Estimate of the Situation. The Estimate of the Situation was a well-defined process that—like Karl’s X-Matrix—walked participants through exploring options and formulating strategies. Unlike Karl’s three-level hierarchy, it was fractal, so any level of the organizational structure could use the Estimate. What made it really powerful was the conversations it triggered (hence the importance of conferences).

I’d never met Henrik before, but it was a pleasure to talk with him. He describes himself as a systems thinker who focuses on making companies more resilient and more fun. That really came though in our conversation and I was pleased to learn more about his perspective.

Check out the podcast to hear more about our discussion and the different themes we explored like John Boyd’s OODA Loop, Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s Skin in the Game, and Steven Bungay’s The Art of Action.

Thoughts from SMH 2018

I attended the Society of Military History’s annual conference in Louisville, KY last week and it was a wonderful time. I enjoyed catching up with old friends, making new ones, and sitting in on some very thought-provoking panels.

IMG_1364Learning Across Peace and War

The conference’s theme was “Landscapes of War and Peace” so I put together a panel on learning in the U.S. Navy of the early 20th century, before, during, and after World War I. My paper was about the early development of U.S. Navy doctrine and I attempted to illustrate the importance of certain methods developed at the Naval War College—the conference method, the estimate of the situation, and the concept of “doctrine”—and how these ideas influenced the development of tactical doctrine within the fleet (there’s more on that in my book).

I thought it was an excellent panel. There was a nice synergy between my paper and the others. K.J. Delamer discussed the importance of Mahan’s thought for the campaign in the Pacific in World War II. Larry Burke presented on the early development of American naval aviation; his paper reminded me how much emphasis there was on making “every ship” an airplane carrier from the earliest days, something I had noticed in my own research, but have never stressed the way Larry did. Randy Papadopoulos was our commentator and said something that I felt was particularly important. “Doctrine” as we understand it today seems to have originated with Dudley Knox and his work at the Naval War College; that was a major element of my paper, but it merits further study.

Race, Progressivism, and Holy War

One theme that emerged from several of the panels I attended was the idea of race. “Was the First Crusade an Offensive or Defensive War?” was a panel discussion in which attendees wrestled with changing definitions of “offensive” and “defensive” war over very long timescales. It was quickly apparent that the justifications used in the eleventh century to “defend” Christendom would not be considered “defensive” today, but the discussion was still quite valuable. One question surfaced the importance of race as a means of distancing Christians from Muslims and justifying a “holy war.”

That idea was in my mind when I attended “Bayonets & Bolos: The Sharp End of Military Culture in the U.S. and the Philippines.” Garrett Gatzemeyer gave a particularly interesting paper on the relationship between bayonet training in the U.S. Army during World War I and the role of progressive reformers. Their emphasis on the importance of “manpower and manhood” to win the war reflected Social Darwinist assumptions about relationships between races and the superiority of white Americans. Justin C. Pergolizzi’s paper on the Dominican Constabulary established by the U.S. Marine Corps in 1917 touched on very similar themes, drawing attention to the paternalistic racism of American interventions in Central America and the Caribbean.

Race was a central theme of the keynote, “Southern Cross, North Star – The Politics of Irreconciliation and Civil War Memory in the American Middle Border” by Christopher Phillips. He went through the themes explored in his award-winning book, The Rivers Ran Backward which explores the influence of the Civil War on the Midwestern states. The talk was a fascinating look at the troubled time in that region immediately following the Civil War and how regional differences and discrete “northern” and “southern” myth-making influenced racial attitudes. Phillips pointed out how rural counties embraced white nationalism while industrial modernization overtook the cities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a development that influences American politics to this day.

Early Sunday morning, I heard Matthew S. Muehlbauer discuss his paper, “Defending the City on the Hill: Holy War and Just War in Early New England, 1630-55” which built on his 2017 award-winning article on holy war and just war in New England during the same time period. He referenced Geraldine Heng’s The Invention of Race in the European Middle Ages and described differing attitudes between the settlers in Massachusetts Bay and along the Connecticut River. Where the former seemed to be predisposed to use just war approaches to legitimize fighting Native Americans, the latter quickly framed the conflict in holy war terms. The Native Americans were “others” and it was, therefore, justifiable to slaughter them (as at Mystic in May 1637) using the terminology of holy war. Muehlbauer closed with a hypothesis that fear plays an important role in how race is used to justify conflict; the Connecticut River colonists were much more fearful—because of the surprise attacks on them—than those in Massachusetts Bay.

Naval History?

Few panels addressed naval history directly, aside from mine and another scheduled at the same time, but there was one from the Naval Institute and another with Ryan Wadle. I’m excited for his forthcomingbook on Harry Yarnell. I’ll write about observations from those sessions in a future post.

Learning War is Coming!

I haven’t written here in some time, but I have been doing plenty of writing. My book on organizational learning in the U.S. Navy of the early twentieth century is being published by the U.S. Naval Institute this June and I’m very excited about it.

What’s it About?

Learning War: The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1898-1945 is an analysis of the development of the U.S. Navy’s approach to surface warfare—how it planned to fight a fleet action with battleships and supporting vessels—between the Spanish-American War and the end of World War II. In my analysis, I treat the U.S. Navy as a complex adaptive system and use concepts from that discipline, like enabling constraints and emergence, to illustrate why it was so effective at rapidly learning and consistently innovating. The first half of the twentieth century was a period of rapid technological change; it saw the introduction of new platforms—like destroyers, dreadnought battleships, and airplanes—and new technologies—like mechanical fire control computers, radio, radar, and turbine propulsion. The U.S. Navy was particularly effective at integrating all of these into its force structure and tactics.

How Does it Relate to Today?

Although today’s contexts and technologies are different, I believe the basic concepts that underpinned the U.S. Navy’s approach to learning and innovation are still relevant. I’ve used many of them effectively in my work with software teams; these include creating an environment of psychological safety, leveraging variability to rapidly explore new techniques and methods, and fostering decentralized decision-making to seize fleeting opportunities. In the book, I explain how these approaches developed and evolved in the U.S. Navy’s context. A core theme is the importance of continually revising approaches to ensure they remain relevant, something that the Agile community is wrestling with right now.

It will be great to see Learning War in print. I think my work is done. I’ve finalized the draft; I’ve been through page proofs and made corrections; I’ve edited the index; and I’ve gotten some very positive early feedback from historians I deeply respect. It’s been an amazing journey. If you’re interested, you can find the book on the U.S. Naval Institute’s Website, Amazon, or other booksellers.
Learning War_final.indd

Lean Agile Scotland – Designing the Future

Once again, Lean Agile Scotland was an excellent conference full of thought-provoking ideas and stimulating conversations. It was a pleasure to attend and speak at the event. I gained numerous insights; here are some of the most interesting.

Design or Lean Agile?

At the start of the second day, Cameron Tonkinwise challenged the audience with his keynote by contrasting Agile methods with the process of “design.” Although his familiarity with Agile in the workplace is limited, Cameron has a deep knowledge of design and its philosophical underpinnings. For him, design is a creative process that, by integrating ideation, prejudgment, and early evaluation, supports innovative leaps.

Cameron argued that Agile, because of its emphasis on rapid iteration and trial-and-error, is incapable of similar innovation. Instead, Agile focuses on incremental improvements which generate a lot of waste. Teams build more and more “stuff” and they discover what value is, not from conceptualization and reasoning, but by testing it with users in the real world. As many of us have learned, this can be very wasteful.

It was a powerful critique, but it didn’t stop there. Cameron argued that Agile promotes the “corrosive cynicism of empiricism” by assuming that mental models and expert judgments are irrelevant. Instead, reality is defined by what we learn from new software deployments and how they change the behavior of users. I was stunned by how well his argument resonated with me; I have become concerned by the declining importance of expert knowledge, but I never conflated that trend with Agile practices.

Cameron Tonkinwise explored the difference between Lean, Agile, and Design.

Cameron Tonkinwise explored the difference between Lean, Agile, and Design.

If we believe expert judgement has value, how do we leverage it in our software development processes? What can we do to address the problem? Cameron recommended changing our metaphors; we need to emphasize experimentation and exploration over testing and iterating. He encouraged us to create discourse with users and involve them in co-creating the future. These are powerful, tangible suggestions. I was very pleased with them as they reflect what I’ve come to believe after many years in the industry, but have never expressed so eloquently. They’re also what we’re trying to do.

Strategy Deployment, Scaling, and Doctrine

Karl Scotland ran a very effective workshop introducing his approach to Strategy Deployment, which he described as collective sense-making. He walked through three interrelated tools: the X-Matrix, which frames aspirations, strategies, tactics, and evidence; the Backbriefing A3, which is used for developing specific operational plans; and the Experiment A3, which defines low-level tactical improvements. All these formats are available as templates on his website and it was exciting to see them in action. The great value they bring is the structured conversations they foster, a point that Karl effectively demonstrated in his workshop.

Karl Scotland deployed his strategy.

Cat Swetel built on these ideas. She described how she used Strategy Deployment to help an organization devise a custom scaling approach. It integrated development and operations, reflected the organization’s specific context, and allowed much more effective performance. Cat effectively explained how Strategy Deployment can work in the real-world and also gave us a fresh look at scaling in context.

Cat Swetel linked strategy, operations, and tactics.

I tried to do something similar in my presentation on Strategy and Doctrine. I argued that the two are synergistic; effective strategies can lead to new and better doctrines, while better doctrines can permit more effective strategies. Therefore, an evolutionary approach is required for each, so that they can change in light of new opportunities and changing circumstances.

Designing Organizations

The evening of the second day, there was a panel discussion involving several of the speakers. The topic was “organizational design” and it explored many different concepts. Esko Kilpi noted that our approach to organizational design has become too reductionist and insufficiently conscious of context. He feels that we need to place more value on connections and networks, the “in between” that is too often ignored. Cameron argued that one of the merits of an organization is the separation it creates. We can view our membership in an organization as separate from who we are as a person and “do work” without “disappearing into work,” a very valuable point. Alex Harms, Sal Freudenberg, and Mike Sutton riffed off of this exchange, adding their own ideas while Jabe Bloom facilitated. I found it all quite valuable. Everyone seemed to agree that organizations should have an “intent” and that those who assume responsibility for their design need to be deliberate about what that intent is and how it is created. What is the organization’s purpose?

Greg Brougham explained how to design a complex organization.

The next day, Greg Brougham built on these ideas. He discussed two examples of successful organizational design using a clear sense of purpose and sensitivity to context. He framed these as examples of emergent complexity. Each was triggered by the deliberate introduction of constraints, boundaries within which the members of the organization self-organized. Some specific examples of constraints were delivering to the customer every two months, focusing on value, and structured approaches to problem-solving. These harnessed the creativity of individuals without dictating solutions, allowing effective complex structures to evolve from initially simple ones. It was very similar to what I had said about evolutionary approaches to Strategy and Doctrine: constraints are the secret sauce that foster self-organization.

I was very grateful to be able to attend Lean Agile Scotland, sit in on these sessions, and have a series of conversations with the speakers. It was a wonderful conference; I cannot wait until next year!

2017 McMullen Naval History Symposium

IMG_1786I thoroughly enjoyed being part of the “extraordinary breadth” of scholarship presented at the McMullen Naval History Symposium last week at the U.S Naval Academy in Annapolis, MD. It was a wonderful conference, and Cdr. B.J. Armstrong deserves a lot of credit for its success. I’m very glad I finally got to meet him.

I attended several thought-provoking sessions on World War I, the interwar period (1919-1939), and the Battle of the Virginia Capes. I participated on a panel titled “1942 and Its Continued Historical Relevancy for the U.S. Navy” and I was also fortunate to win second prize in the CNO (Chief of Naval Operations) Naval History Essay Contest. I discussed my essay with some of the other winners in a session last Friday morning. Here are some of my highlights from the conference.

David Kohnen discussed the report of the “[Dudley W.] Knox, [William S.] Pye, [Ernest J.] King Board” issued in 1919 and its impact on officer education in the U.S. Navy. The report is an important part of the story of how the U.S. Navy harnessed the lessons of World War I and improved its approach to officer education before World War II. It was not surprising to hear that King was the “principal man” behind the report. It was also not surprising to learn that King published a version of the report in the Naval Institute’s Proceedings in 1920, sparking heated debate. Kohnen pointed out the importance of officer relationships for understanding the U.S. Navy of this period. King was a protégé of Henry T. Mayo, who commanded the Atlantic Fleet during World War I, and also knew William S. Sims, who commanded American naval forces in Europe. These more senior officers gave King and his colleagues “top cover” for the report and its recommendations.

Alexander Howlett presented his research into lessons learned by the Royal Navy’s Air Service and the Royal Air Force (RAF) in their campaign against the German U-Boats in 1917 and 1918. I thought one of his most interesting findings was that the British Admiralty allowed a great deal of variability; the development of tactics and doctrine devolved to individual stations. Those that created effective partnerships with surface forces and devised new techniques were more successful. When the RAF was formed, much of this learning appears to have been lost. Increasing centralization and ignorance of the best techniques for fighting the U-Boats prevented the RAF from capitalizing on established lessons. I enjoyed discussing this important shift with Howlett later that evening.

Branden Little highlighted the fact that U.S. Navy ships were used to ferry gold to American citizens in Europe immediately after the outbreak of war in 1914. Currency destabilized and many vacationers found themselves stranded without a means to pay for food, transportation, or lodging. The gold was a deliberate loan to allow Americans to pay for their needs before coming back to the United States. Armored cruiser Tennessee alone provided $5,867,000 according to one contemporary newspaper.

Sidney M. Chester followed the path of Tennessee and her sister North Carolina. They were sent to the Mediterranean where they spent a good deal of time in Beirut, then the “center of American and protestant activity” in the Middle East. The ships helped maintain harmony between various religious and ethnic groups; Chester related how more frequent liberty for the crews furthered this goal. Evidently, the sailors were good at picking fights and the regular fisticuffs diffused ethnic violence, a fascinating dynamic that I had never considered.

In our 1942 panel, I discussed the importance of the fighting in the Solomon Islands and how it triggered the U.S. Navy’s system of organizational learning; K.J. Delamer explained that PT Boats, although they had few tactical successes, were part of a multi-dimensional system of unrelenting pressure on the Japanese; and Hal Friedman illustrated that the Naval War College’s exercises of 1946 harkened back to the challenges of early wartime battles like Coral Sea, Eastern Solomons, and Santa Cruz. I particularly liked Delamer’s description of the challenge of attempting to fight steel-hulled Japanese barges in wooden-hulled PT Boats.

I moved out of my main area of interest to attend the session on the Battle of the Virginia Capes, and I’m very glad I did. James Holmes presented his “strategist take on history” by describing the effective ways in which the British deprioritized the North American colonies in favor of more important strategic theaters, like the sugar islands in the Caribbean. Holmes used the concepts of war developed by Carl von Clausewitz to frame his discussion and it was quite effective. However, at the end he introduced the idea of antifragility as developed by Nassim Nicholas Taleb, suggesting that liberal democracies like 18th century Britain can “bounce back” from failures like that experienced by the loss of the colonies.

During the commentary and questions, I started to consider the implications of this. We can potentially do ourselves a disservice if we apply a clausewitzian frame to the process of military decision-making in all times and periods. The way Holmes described the British approach, it seemed much less like a clear process of finding the “decisive theater” and much more a series of experiments and hypotheses intended to determine the most effective potential outcome. More specifically, I started to wonder if the concept of antifragility might not be a better frame for understanding British strategy in the late 18th century. Could the move into the southern colonies, which ultimately resulted in disaster t Yorktown, be seen as a minor investment with significant potential upside rather than a strategic mistake? I think that is a valuable question worth further investigation.

There were many other important sessions and talented presenters. I regret that I could not attend them all, but it has me looking forward to the next one in 2019. The McMullen Symposium is a great opportunity to learn, connect, and share ideas with the most talented minds in the field of Naval History.

 

What is Doctrine Anyway?

BB_LineLater this year, I’ll be sharing the stage at SDI Miami with Stephen Bungay, whose book, “The Art of Action,” has been influential in the Agile community. He’ll be continuing to expand on his thesis—that the Prussian General Staff identified an effective approach to organizing for collective action in the face of uncertainty—and presenting on “Blitzkrieg: Lessons in Organizational Agility & Strategy.” I’m looking forward to seeing how he relates the success of the German Army in the early years of World War II to the management challenges of today.

I plan to do something similar, but with a less familiar example. I’ll be highlighting the importance of rapid organizational learning by discussing the Allied offensive at Guadalcanal in late 1942. The series of naval battles triggered by that offensive led to revisions in the U.S. Navy’s doctrine—its approach to combat. Whereas Bungay will discuss the merits of the German Army’s doctrine, I’ll be presenting the importance of developing doctrinal agility: the ability to rapidly refine, adapt, and evolve doctrine.

So what is Doctrine?

In my forthcoming book on organizational learning in the U.S. Navy, I define doctrine this way:

Doctrine is the set of implicit and explicit assumptions that govern the behavior of a military force. It is what officers and sailors fall back on to guide their decisions when precise instructions are not available. It has a parallel to “culture” or “ethos” but greater specificity than either one.

Bungay (and many others) contend that the German Army’s doctrine was particularly effective because it created a common sense of what to do and how to do it, allowing large collections of individual soldiers to act in concert with minimal need for explicit instructions. I contend that the U.S. Navy’s doctrine was effective because it retained the ability to evolve and change in the face of new information. These are related concepts, but the difference is important.

Why Should I Care about Doctrine?

Whether we are aware of the process or not, doctrine influences how we make decisions. We’ve all experienced the influence of doctrine in our work. Some organizations tend to centralize decisions, perhaps in the hands of a senior engineer or manager. Those who fail to defer to them are stigmatized or punished, quickly creating a doctrine of centralized decision-making. Other organizations attempt to empower teams with the ability to collaboratively make decisions. When leaders—managers, senior engineers, scrum masters, etc.—reinforce this concept, the doctrine of empowered teams spreads. Many more examples exist. In most cases, organizational doctrines are implicit, but they exert a powerful influence.

Military forces explicitly create a doctrine based on their preferred approach. Drill, exercise, and repetition creates patterns—what Daniel Kahneman calls “heuristics”—that become the preferred approach to solving specific problems. There are two challenges in this. First, the heuristics must align with the organization’s goals and objectives. Second, the heuristics must not be so deeply embedded that they cannot change. The U.S. Navy was particularly adept at both seventy-five years ago.

Come to SDI Miami and I’ll explain why this was so, and what the implications are for modern organizations.

Looking Forward to Lean Kanban North America

This post first appeared on Excella Consulting’s Blog.

Next month I’ll be speaking at Lean Kanban North America. The last time I attended, in 2015, I was a finalist for the Brickell Key Award. I had been helping distributed teams align their work and increase their situational awareness by using Kanban. Jim Benson and I spoke about the positive aspects of that experience, but we spent more time on Kanban’s dark side. We argued it could become an oubliette—a claustrophobic dungeon—in certain circumstances. If you’re interested, you can see the video here. I really enjoyed the experience, and I’m excited to go back.

Kanban for your Brain

This year, I’m going to be focusing on something slightly different. One my favorite things about Kanban is the subtle shifts it triggers in our minds. It’s a huge relief for me when I can get things I need to do out of my head and onto my Personal Kanban. Once they’re there, I don’t have to focus on remembering them, and seeing them set out as a collection of options—work I can start when I feel it’s best—gives me an increased sense of control. I’ve seen the same thing happen for my daughter when she uses Kanban to help make sense of her homework.

Kanban offloads mental processing and reduces our cognitive burden. With a team, this dynamic becomes even more profound. A team Kanban becomes a shared view of their work. At the most basic level, this reduces everyone’s cognitive load, just like my Personal Kanban does for me. But effective Kanban systems will do much more than that. They will become a system of distributed cognition.

Kanban and Distributed Cognition

Distributed cognition doesn’t mean a distributed team. Distributed in this sense means that there is a broad cognitive—or sense-making—activity taking place that is greater than the sum of the individual parts. The interaction of the team and their board creates the potential for more effective and more rapid decision-making. This is especially true if the team has invested in customizing their board to incorporate details like classes of service, specific types of work, and defined capacity allocations. The increased amount of information allows the board to become a decision-support system. Everyone working with it knows what choices to make and what conversations to trigger. When a team gets to this level, it’s electrifying!

Historical Parallels

This isn’t the first time this sort of thing has happened. My favorite historical example is from the U.S. Navy’s experience in early World War II. During the confused night battles in the Solomon Island chain, task force commanders and ship captains couldn’t make sense of the situation around them. They had access to revolutionary new sources of information, like radar and very-high frequency radios, but there was no way to effectively understand all the details they provided.

The U.S. Navy had to create a system like Kanban, one that could model the current situation with meaningful symbols, offload the cognitive burden, and help align decision-making. Once that was in place, ship captains had much greater situational awareness. They began to operate as a team and collaborated more effectively. The results were revolutionary.

A good Kanban system will help your team in the same way. Come to Lean Kanban North America and I’ll explain how.